In an nontransferable utility (NTU) exchange economy with a continuum of agents, the Mas-Colell bargaining set c oincides with the set of Walrasian equilibria. In this paper, we show that the Mas-Colell bargaining set, as well a s a s m aller bargaining set due to Zhou, may fail to converge to competitive outcomes in large nite NTU exchange economies.
Introduction
The bargaining set was originally dened by A umann and Maschler [2] and Davis and Maschler [3] . Mas-Colell [ 10] considered exchange economies with a continuum of agents but without transferable utility o r s m ooth preferences. His denition diers from the Aumann-Davis-Maschler denition principally because i t does not involve t h e c oncept of a leader. Under hypotheses similar to those of Aumann's c ore equivalence theorem, h e s h o w ed that the MasColell bargaining set coincides with the set of Walrasian allocations. Since models with a continuum of agents are thought o f a s i dealizatio n s o f l arge economies, it s e emed reasonable to expect that the Mas-Colell bargaining set would b e come approximately competitive i n s e quences of nite exchange economies as the numb e r o f a g e n ts increased. Zhou [13] has proposed additional restrictions on counterobjections; these restrictions are satised in the Aumann-Davis-Maschler denition. Since Zhou's additional restrictions make i t e a s i er to form a justied objection, they make the bargaining set smaller.
In Theorem 3.4, we s h o w that the Mas-Colell and Zhou bargaining sets need not converge in replica sequences of economies. In the example, the measure of the set of individually rational Pareto optimal equal-treatment (IRPOET) allocations which are not in the Mas-Colell and Zhou bargaining sets tends to zero as the economy is replicated; in particular, the set of IR-POET bargaining set allocations converges in the Hausdor distance to the set of all IRPOET allocations. The replica sequence i n the example satises the hypotheses of the Debreu-Scarf theorem [5] and of Debreu's rate of convergence theorem for the core [4] . The cooperative g a m e g e nerated b y the example has transferable utility and satises the assumptions of Shapley and Shubik [11] ; thus, the Aumann-Davis-Maschler bargaining set does converge. The d i s crepancy between the behavior of the Mas-Colell bargaining set in the continuum and its behavior in sequences of large nite economies gives reason t o b e c autious in a c cepting the continuum as the proper idealization of a \ l arge" economy.
The essence of the nonconvergence example is e asy to describe. It is a replica s e quence with two goods and two t ypes of agents. Let f be an IRPOET allocation and let f n denote the n-fold replica o f f . Let the agents of type 2 be relatively f a v ored by f , and the agents of type 1 disfavored. One rst shows that if a coalition S can make a justied M as-Colell o r Z hou objection to f , then S must contain all n agents of ty p e 1 ; i f n o t , one could form a counterobjection by s w i tching one of the typ e 1 a g e n ts omitted from S for one of the type 1 agents included in S . There is an ideal ratio t of the number o f t y p e 2 a g e n ts to type 1 agents that maximizes the utility that can be provided t o t y p e 1 a g e n ts. For most n, i t w i ll be the case that there exist = n that f n is not in the Mas-Colell and Zhou bargaining sets. Thus, the nonconvergence example is driven entirely by an integer problem.
Anderson [1] shows that a dierent bargaining set, due to Geanakoplos [8] , is approximately competitive i n l arge nite NTU exchange economies. In addition, in large nite NTU exchange economies with smooth preferences and uniformly bounded endowments, the Aumann-Davis-Maschler bargaining set is approximately competitive.
The A umann-Davis-Maschler bargaining set diers from the Mas-Colell bargaining set only by the designation of a single i ndividual as the leader of an objection. The nonconvergence example occurs in a r e plica sequence of TU economies with smooth preferences which satises all the assumptions of the convergence theorem for the Aumann-Davis-Maschler bargaining set in Anderson [1] . It is remarkable that the designation of a single leader should make s u c 2 Preliminaries
We b egin with some notation and denitions which w i ll be used throughout. A preference is a binary relation on R k + satisfying the following conditions:
1. weak monotonicity: x y ) x y; 2. continuity: f(x; y) 2 R k ++ : x yg is o p e n; 3. transitivity: i f x y and y z; then x z; 4. negative transitivity: if x 6 y and y 6 z; then x 6 z; 5. irreexivity: x 6 x; and 6. convexity: fx : x yg is a convex set. Let P denote the set of preferences. If 2 P , dene x y if x 6 y and y 6 x, x y if x y or x y. N ote that the indierence relation x y is dened from the underlying strict preference relation x y, and is not one of the primitives of the specication of the economy. Proof:
1. First, we prove c o n c lusion 1. There are two c a s e s t o c onsider.
(a) If y z, then x z by transitivity.
(b) If y z, t h e n z 6 y; i f x 6 z, then x 6 y by negative transitivity, contradiction. Therefore, x z.
2. The proof of conclusion 2 is essentially the same as the proof of conclusion 1 .
3. Now, we turn to conclusion 3. Since x y and is weakly m onotone, we may nd x n ! x with x n x, h e n ce x n y, s o x n y . I f y x , then y x n for n suciently large, by c ontinuity; but then y x n y, so y y by transitivity, contradicting irreexivity. Therefore, x y, so x z by c onclusion 2.
An exchange economy i s a m ap : A ! P 2 R k + ; where A is a nite set of agents. For a 2 A; let a denote the preference o f a (i.e. the projection of (a) o n to P) a n d e ( a ) the initial endowment o f a (i.e. the projection of A weak objection to an allocation f is a pair (S;g), where S is a c oalition,
P a2S e(a), and g(a) a f(a) for all a 2 S with strict preference for at least one a: (2) An allocation f is strongly Pareto optimal if there is no weak objection (S; g) to f with S = A. A strong objection to an allocation f is a pair (S; g), where
S is a coalition, g : S ! R 
The bargaining set will be dened, roughly, a s t h e s e t o f a l l a l locations such that every objection admit s a c ounterobjection. Suppose that preferences are continuous, strongly monotonic (i.e. x > y ! x y ), transitive and negatively transitive. It is then well known that an allocation is weakly Pareto optimal if and only if i t i s strongly Pareto optimal. The same argument s h o ws the following two f a c ts:
1. if preferences are strongly monotonic, continuous, transitive and negatively transitive, and f is a n a l l ocation, then f admits a weak objection if and only i f i t a d m its a strong objection; and 2. if preferences are strongly monotonic, continuous, transitive and negatively transitive, and (S; g) i s a ( w eak or strong) objection to f, then (S; g) admits a weak counterobjection if and only if it a d m i ts a strong counterobjection.
However, as we shall see below in Proposition 3.2, it i s v ery hard to construct a strong objection which does not admit a counterobjection. Thus, in the denition of the bargaining set, it m atter s a g r e at deal whether w e require objections to be weak or strong. Accordingly, w e m ust dene more than one bargaining set. The weak Mas-Colell bargaining set, denoted B w (), is the set of all allocations to which e v ery strong objection has a strong counterobjection; if preferences are continuous, strongly m onotonic, transitive a n d n e g a t ively transitive, this is the same as the set of all allocations to which every strong objectio n h a s a w e ak counterobjection. The strong Mas-Colell bargaining set, denoted B s (), is the set of a l l a l locations to which e v e ry weak objectio n h a s a w eak counterobjection; if preferences are continuous, strongly monotonic, transitive and negatively transitive, this is the same a s t h e s e t o f a l l allocations to which e v ery w e ak objection has a strong counterobjection. Observe that if preferences are continuous, strongly monotonic, transitive and negatively transitive,
If an objection has no counterobjection (weak or strong, as determined by the context), we w i ll say that the objection is justied. Zhou [13] has proposed adding three restrictions on counterobjections:
1. T \ S 6 = ;; 2. S 6 T ; 3. T 6 S. The Zhou bargaining set, denoted B Z (), is the set of all allocations such that every weak objection admi t s a w e ak counterobjection satisfying these three restrictions.
If T \ S = ;, then a (weak or strong) counterobjection (T;h) w ould h a v e little deterrent e ect on the members of S in proposing the objection (S; g); even if the members of T do implement h, i t is still feasible for the members of S to implement g. I f S T , then every member of S would be willing to put (T; h) forward as an objection in place o f ( S; g). For more comments on the motivation for these restrictions, see Zhou [13] . 3 Nonconvergence Examples for the Mas-
Colell and Zhou Bargaining Sets
We will c onsider replica s e quences o f e c onomies, as dened by Edgeworth [7] and Debreu and Scarf [5] . T h e b ase economy is dened by : A ! P 2 R k + .
T h e n -f o l d r e p l i c a o f is n : A n ! P 2 R k + where A n = A 2 f1; : : : ; n g n ( a; j) = (a) ( 1 j n ) :
The n-fold replica o f a n a l l o c ation f is f n : A n ! R k + with f n (a; j) = f (a) ( 1 j n ) : (8) In Proposition 3.2, we s h o w t h a t t h e w e ak bargaining set i s v e ry big i n replica economies with two t ypes of agents; in the light o f t he situation in continuum economies, this is not surprising. In Theorem 3 . 4, we s h o w t h a t t h e s t r o n g Mas-Colell bargaining set and the Zhou bargaining set m a y a l so be very big in replica economies, in sharp contrast with the situation in continuum economies.
We b e gin with some propositions concerning the bargaining set in the replica context. g(a; j) a f(a) for all j satisfying (a; j ) 2S (9) or (b) (a; j) 2 S for all j 2 f 1 ; : : : ; n g ; 2 .t h e r e exists a 2 A such that (a; j) 2 S for all j 2 f 1 ; : : : ; n g ; a n d 3. if f n is strongly Pareto optimal, then there exists a 2 A such that (a; j) 6 2 S for some j.
Proof:
1. Fix a 2 A. If (a; j) = 2 S (1 j n), then e quation 9 is v acuously satised. Now suppose (a; j) 2 S for some j. Suppose (a; i) = 2 S. By the denition of a weak objection, g(a; j) a f (a) for j satisfying (a; j ) 2S . I f g ( a; j) a f(a) f or some j, l e t T = ( S [ f ( a ; i ) g ) nf(a;j)g. Clearly, S 6 T and T 6 S. T h e re are two c ases to consider: Since both cases l ead to a c ontradiction, g(a; j) a f(a) for all j such that (a; j ) 2S . 2. If for every a 2 A, there exists j with (a; j ) 6 2 S, then g(a; j) a f(a) for all (a; j ) 2S , b y item 1 . B ut then (S;g) i s n o t a w eak objection to f n , c ontradiction. Hence, there is s o m e a 2 A with (a; j) 2 S for all j 2 f 1 ; : : : ; n g . 3 .Suppose f n is strongly Pareto optimal. Then S A n ; S 6 = A n . Thus, there is some a 2 A and some j 2 f 1 ; : : : ; n gsuch that (a; j ) 6 2 S.
The following proposition shows that, in replica economies with two t ypes of agents, the weak Mas-Colell bargaining set is extremely large. A similar phenomenon occurs in the continuum context, as noted b y Mas-Colell [10] . Proposition 3.2 Suppose jAj = 2 , f is any individually rational allocation o f a b ase economy : A ! P 2 R k + , a is strongly monotonic for each a 2 A, f n is the n-fold replica o f f , and n > 1 . I f f n i s w e a kly Pareto optimal in n , then f n 2 B w ( n ) .
Proof: Suppose (S; g) is a strong objection to f n . S i nce f n is w eakly Pareto optimal, we h a v e S 6 = A n , so there exists (a; j) with (a; j ) 6 2 S. R elabelling, we may assume without loss of generality that a = 1 . S i nce strong objections are weak objections, item 1 of Lemma 3.1 implies we are in one of two cases:
1. (S; g) h a s a w eak counterobjection. Since preferences are continuous, strongly monotonic and transitive, (S; g) also has a strong counterobjection.
2. g(1; j ) 1 f (1) for all j such t h a t ( 1 ; j )2S . Since (S; g) i s a strong objection, we m ust have ( 1 ; j )6 2 S for j = 1 ; : : : ; n .Since jAj = 2 , w e h a v e P n j = 1 g ( 2 ; j ) = ne(2). g(2; j ) 2 f ( 2 ) 2 e ( 2 )b e c ause f is individually rational. By Lemma 2.1, g(2; j ) 2 e ( 2 ) .B yc o n v e xity, e(2) = 1 n P n j=1 g(2; j ) e (2), contradicting irreexivity.
Thus, we are always in the rst case. Accordingly, e v ery strong objection has a strong counterobjection, so f n 2 B w ( n ). (12) and let f n denote the n-fold r e plica o f f , i . e. f n (a; j ) = f ( a ). Let denote Lebesgue measure on R. 
for all a. Thus, the cooperative g a m e generated by n has transferable utility, w i th characteristic function V (S) = u ( P a 2 S e ( a )). 2). Moreover, we c an also assume w i thout lo s s o f g e nerality that n 2.
3. Suppose (S; g) i s a w eak objection to f n with no weak Zhou counterobjection. Observe that f n is strongly P areto optimal. T h us, renumbering if necessary, w e nd we are in e ither 
and if m = n 01, (3m + n + 2 ) = 3 n + m and (3n + m 02) = 3m + n: (20) Therefore, it is feasible in T to give the m type 1 agents in S \ T utility , t he type 1 agent i n T n S utility u(g(2; n )) > , and the ty p e 2 a g e n ts in T the same utility l evel they received under g; if we d o s o , w e produce a w eak Mas-Colell counterobjection. By construction, T 6 S; m oreover, S 6 T and S\T 6 = ;, s i nce n 2, so T can form a Zhou counterobjection.
(b) Therefore, we m ust be in C a s e I I , s o S c ontains all n agents of type 1 and m < n agents of type 2. Moreover, u(g(2; j ) ) = 4 0 whenever (2; j )2S , and we can assume w i thout loss of generality that u(g(1; 1)) u(g(1; 2)) 1 1 1u ( g (1; n ) ). 
ii. 
Since 0 < t < 1, there are innitely m any pairs (p;q) with 1 q 2 < and 5 p q05 (and thus q 3) satisfying Equation 
by Equation (26). But then a coalition T consisting of q agents of type 1 (namely, agents (1; 1); : : : ; (1; q )) and p agents of type 2 c an counterobject to (S; g), since S has n agents of typ e 1 a n d m agents of type 2. Since m < n , w e c an choose one of the p type 2 agents (say, agent ( 2 ; j 0 )) from the complement o f S . Observe that (1; 1) 2 S \ T (since q > 0), (2; j 0 ) 2TnS , and (1; n ) 2SnT . T h e refore, T can form a Zhou counterobjection, contradiction. Thus, we h a v e s h o wn that f n 2 B Z ( n ) for innitely many n.
v. N o w, we w i ll show that Equation (14) 
